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Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-Form Game
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We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline 
treatment with common knowledge of the game structure and feedback about choices in the 
previous period, we run treatments (i) without feedback about previous play, (ii) with no 
information about the opponent’s payoffs and (iii) with random matching. Using Stahl and 
Wilson’s (1995) model of limited strategic reasoning, we classify behavior with regard to its 
strategic sophistication and consider its development over time. We use belief statements to 
check for the consistency of subjects’ actions with the stated beliefs as well as for the 
accuracy of their beliefs (relative to the opponent’s true choice). In the baseline treatment we 
observe more sophisticated play as well as more accurate beliefs and more best responses 
to beliefs over time. We isolate feedback as the main driving force of learning to play 
strategically and to form beliefs that accurately predict the behavior of the opponent. 
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The literature on learning has opened the black box of how an equilibrium is reached. Numerous
theoretical and experimental papers have studied learning over a large number of periods and
have focused either on the convergence properties of the learning algorithms or on the evolution of
observed behavior in experimental data. Here, we focus on the development of strategic behavior
in relatively few periods of play. The idea is to take a microscopic view of how beliefs and choices
change over time, controlling for the role of information in this process.
We use a repeated two-person normal-form game with a unique Nash equilibrium of the
stage game. In this relatively simple setup, we observe whether subjects learn to play the game in
the sense that the Nash-equilibrium strategy is chosen more often in later than in earlier periods.
A novel feature of the experiment is that we elicit the beliefs of a player about the action of the
other player in every period. Thus, we can observe the joint development of beliefs and actions
over time. This allows us to answer a number of questions in a dynamic setting that up to now
have only been studied in one-shot games.
A widely used classi￿cation of behavior is the level-of-reasoning model of Stahl and Wilson
(1995). In this model players can be distinguished by their levels of strategic thinking. Players
with no sophistication randomize uniformly over their strategy space (level-0 type), whereas a
player with one step of thinking best responds to L0-types, etc. The model also incorporates other
types to capture perfectly rational behavior like the Nash or rational expectation types. We use
the most prominent rules (L1;L2 and Nash) to classify the actions of our game according to their
strategic sophistication and to study how the sophistication of players change over time.
This categorization of choices according to their strategic sophistication is complemented
by the elicited beliefs. We show that the beliefs stated by the participants are better predictors of
the actual choices than the beliefs estimated from choices with belief-learning models. Assuming
that both stated beliefs and estimated beliefs are only a proxy of the true underlying beliefs, we can
conclude that stated beliefs are the better proxy. We then use the stated beliefs to analyze whether
players￿actions are best responses to their beliefs more frequently in later than in earlier periods
of the experiment. In addition, we study whether beliefs become more accurate in predicting the
opponents￿actual behavior in later periods. The (in)accuracy of beliefs can be interpreted as a
measure of strategic uncertainty.
In order to better understand the reasons for the development of actions and beliefs over
2time, we vary the information that is available to the players. Learning theories typically make use
only of a limited amount of information. To be able to separate between di⁄erent forms of learning,
we run a baseline treatment with full information about the game and with feedback about one￿ s
own payo⁄ (and thereby the other￿ s payo⁄ and action) in the previous period. In addition, we
employ a treatment where subjects do not get any feedback about the outcome of play in the
previous period and a treatment where subjects do not know the payo⁄s of the other player in the
game, only their own payo⁄s. As we change only one aspect at a time, we can observe which kind
of information is important for the learning process. Finally, we control for repeated game a⁄ects
by running a treatment with random matching in every period.
Two extreme learning patterns can be distinguished with our experiment. First, subjects
can learn inductively, based on the history of play. Players look back to determine which strategy
to choose in the next period. For example, belief learning and reinforcement learning fall into this
category. Second, deductive reasoning implies that players analyze the game in order to understand
its strategic properties and thereby form beliefs about the opponent￿ s choice. This learning with-
out feedback requires more sophistication of the players than most inductive learning algorithms.
While both forms of learning have already been studied in di⁄erent experiments, we provide a uni-
￿ed framework to compare no-feedback learning with inductive learning. The treatment without
feedback information and the treatment without information about the opponent￿ s payo⁄s allow us
to separate the two forms of learning. Using the level-of-reasoning model, we characterize behavior
as strategic or non-strategic and can then evaluate under which information conditions subjects
learn faster to play strategically than in others.
Concerning the results, we ￿nd an initially high level of non-strategic behavior in all treat-
ments, i.e., subjects tend to neglect the incentives of their opponents. In the baseline treatment
with full information about the game and feedback about past outcomes, this non-strategic behav-
ior decreases in later periods. Experience also has a moderate positive impact on the accuracy of
beliefs and on the best-response rates in the baseline treatment.
The control treatments show that the learning path crucially depends on the information
available. Information about the other player￿ s payo⁄s is important for initial play, but not as much
as to be expected from rational players. Thus, subjects seem to have only a limited understanding
of the strategic properties of the game initially, even if they have full information about the game.
Also, behavior over time is very similar in treatments with and without information about the
opponent￿ s payo⁄ function. However, our results indicate the importance of feedback. In the
3treatment without feedback about past outcomes, there is virtually no change in behavior over
time. Thus, independent of whether subjects know the complete game or only their own payo⁄s,
it is the experience through feedback which reduces non-strategic behavior.
Both in standard Nash equilibrium and in the level-of-reasoning model, players are assumed
to best respond to their beliefs. However, best-response rates are initially only between 50% and
60% in the baseline treatment. We observe an increase in best responses over time in the baseline
treatment, but not in any other treatment. Thus, receiving information about the past play of one￿ s
opponent and about his incentives in the game allows subjects to learn to best respond. Regarding
the accuracy of belief statements in predicting the opponent￿ s behavior, repeated interaction with
the same opponent and information about his past choices are the main determinants of success in
this task.
The literature related to this study can be summarized as follows. First, the level-of-
reasoning model by Stahl and Wilson (1995) has been applied to a number of data sets based
on 3x3 one-shot normal-form games. Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta (2001) study decision
rules and use the mouselab technique to record how subjects use payo⁄ information. Costa-Gomes
and Weizs￿cker (2008) elicit subjects￿beliefs about the other player￿ s choice and ￿nd that subjects
perceive the game di⁄erently when asked for beliefs than when playing it themselves. Rey-Biel
(forthcoming) focuses on constant-sum games to analyze the dependency of equilibrium predictions
on the game characteristics. Finally, Ivanov (2006) combines the level-of-reasoning approach with
risk aversion to explain observed behavior.
Repeated normal-form games with belief elicitation have been studied in two other papers.
Nyarko and Schotter (2002) focus on the matching-pennies game to compare stated beliefs with
Cournot and ￿ctitious-play beliefs. Ehrblatt, Hyndman, ￿zbay and Schotter (2008) use two di⁄er-
ent normal-form games with a unique Pareto-e¢ cient Nash equilibrium in pure strategies to study
convergence to the Nash equilibrium. They focus on the mechanisms underlying the convergence
process and on strategic teaching. Our experimental design is closest to the last paper. However,
the Nash equilibrium in our game is not Pareto-e¢ cient, leading to less convergence. We focus
more broadly on learning how to play strategically and pay close attention to the development and
nature of non-strategic play.
Another strand of the literature studies learning in normal-form games under di⁄erent
information conditions. Oechssler and Schipper (2003) and Gerber (2006) use normal-form games
with incomplete information about the opponents￿payo⁄s in order to study whether players can
4Left Center Right
Top 78, 68 72, 23 12, 20
Middle 67, 52 59, 63 78, 49
Bottom 21, 11 62, 89 89, 78
Table 1: Game
￿gure out which game they are playing. Subjects receive feedback about the strategy chosen by
the other player and can thereby form a "subjective game" (Kalai and Lehrer, 1993). In contrast,
Weber (2003) studies a repeated beauty-contest game without feedback and Weber and Rick (2008)
focus on repeated normal-form games without feedback. Both studies observe some amount of no-
feedback learning.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the design of the experiment
and provides a description of the level-of-reasoning model applied to the normal-form game we
used. In Section 4, we present the results, focusing ￿rst on choices and then on belief statements.
Section 5 contains a discussion and the conclusions.
2 Experimental design
2.1 Procedures
In all treatments of the experiment, we used the asymmetric normal-form game presented in Table
1. The game has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in which the row player chooses
Top and the column player chooses Left. This equilibrium can be found by applying iterative
elimination of dominated strategies. Note that the Nash equilibrium of the stage game is not
Pareto e¢ cient. The strategy combination of Bottom and Right leads to higher payo⁄s for both
players. This outcome maximizes the payo⁄of the player that is least well o⁄, and it also maximizes
the sum of payo⁄s. The unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game is also the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium of the repeated game.1 Finally, note that for the column player choosing Right
is strictly dominated by Center.
1However, there is a Nash equilibrium of the ￿nitely repeated game in which the players play the Pareto-e¢ cient
strategy combination (Bottom, Right) for a number of periods and then switch to the Nash Equilibrium (Top,
Left). In case a player deviates in this equilibrium, she is minmaxed by the other player choosing Middle or Center,
respectively, for the rest of the game.
5Treatment Payo⁄ Feedback Matching Periods Sessions # of subjects
BASE own+opponent own payo⁄ ￿xed 20 4 54
PI own own payo⁄ ￿xed 20 4 48
NF own+opponent none ￿xed 20 4 50
RM own+opponent own payo⁄ random 20 3 40
Table 2: Treatments
To study the impact of information on choices and belief statements we implemented four
treatments, the details of which are given in Table 2. Our main interest is in the baseline treatment,
denoted by BASE. In this treatment subjects had all relevant information about the game, i.e. the
set of players, the set of strategies and the payo⁄ function of each player. In addition, after each
period they received feedback about the payo⁄ earned in this period. Every other treatment di⁄ers
from BASE only in one respect. In the treatments NF (no feedback) and RM (random matching)
subjects had common knowledge of the payo⁄ structure of the game, but we varied either the
available feedback after each period or the matching protocol. In treatment NF, subjects received
no feedback at all. In treatment RM subjects received feedback about their payo⁄, but were
randomly matched with another participant in each period. In treatment PI (partial information),
subjects had incomplete information about some elements of the game. They only knew their own
payo⁄ function, but not the payo⁄ function of their opponent. However, they received feedback
after each period, just as in treatments BASE and RM, such that they could infer the choice of
their opponent. In all treatments subjects did not receive any feedback about their payo⁄s from
the belief elicitation task.2
In the beginning of all treatments, subjects were randomly assigned a player role (row player
or column player), which they kept during the whole experiment. However, they made all their
decisions from the perspective of the row player, i.e. for column players we used a transformation of
the matrix game in Table 1. Before choosing an action (choice task), we asked subjects to indicate
their beliefs regarding the behavior of their opponent (belief task). In particular, we asked subjects
to state the expected frequencies of play, i.e., they had to specify in how many out of 100 times
they expect the column player to choose Left, Center and Right in the current period.3 After the
2Nevertheless, they could infer their payo⁄ from this task in treatments BASE, PI and RM. The main reason for
not showing the payo⁄s from the belief elicitation task was to change as few parameters as possible when going from
BASE, PI and RM to NF.
3For simplicity we restricted the expected frequencies of play to integers. Therefore, we count any belief statement
6belief task, subjects had to make their choice by selecting one of the three possible actions (mixing
was not possible).4
Subjects were paid for both tasks. For the choice task we paid subjects according to the
numbers in the payo⁄ matrix, which were exchanged at the commonly known rate of 1 point = e
0:15. To reward the belief task we used a quadratic scoring rule (QSR) which is incentive compatible
given that subjects are risk-neutral money maximizers. The QSR we used is de￿ned as follows.
The payo⁄ ￿
QSR
it for player i in period t for a given action ak
jt with k 2 fL;C;Rg of player j in


























jt] is an indicator function equal to 1 if ak
jt is chosen in period t and 0 otherwise. While
paying subjects for the choice and the belief task is necessary to ensure incentive compatibility, it
allows subjects to engage in hedging. Subjects can for example coordinate on a cell of the payo⁄
matrix that is not an equilibrium and become unwilling to move away from it in order to avoid
losses in the belief task. To eliminate such behavior, we decided to determine the ￿nal payo⁄s as
follows. First, at the end of the experiment we selected one period randomly and independently to
determine the payo⁄s for each of the two tasks. Second, we used parameters A = 1:5 and B = 0:75
in the QSR. Thus, the maximum payo⁄ from the belief task (e 1:50) is relatively low compared to
payo⁄s from choice task. For instance, the Nash equilibrium [Top, Left] would lead to payo⁄s of e
11:7 and e 10:2 for the two player roles.5
The experiments were conducted in the computer lab at Technical University Berlin using
the software tool kit z-Tree, developed by Fischbacher (2007). Subjects were recruited via a mailing
list through which they could voluntarily register to participate in decision experiments (Greiner,
2004). Upon entering the lab, subjects received written instructions and were asked to read them
carefully.6 After everybody had ￿nished reading the instructions, we distributed an understanding
assigning a weight of 34 percent to one action and 33 percent to each of the remaining actions as a uniform belief
statement.
4We employ belief elicitation in all four treatments to analyze the impact of information on beliefs and choices.
For a recent study of the impact of belief elicitation on choices see Rutstr￿m and Wilcox (2006).
5Note that subjects could guarantee themselves a payo⁄ of e 1 by stating uniform beliefs. Although this would
be an attractive choice for a risk-averse subject, we ￿nd no evidence of such behavior in our treatments. Only 7:5
percent of belief statements assign no less than 30 and no more than 35 percent to all three of the opponent￿ s actions.
(BASE 5:8%, PI 5:9%, NF 12:1% and RM 6:3%)
6For the instructions of the baseline treatment see the Appendix A.4.
7test that covered both the game and the QSR. Only after all subjects had answered the questions
correctly, we proceeded with the experiment. In total 192 students (106 males and 86 females) from
various disciplines participated in the four treatments. Sessions lasted about one hour. Subjects￿
average earnings were about e 12:80, including a show-up fee of e 3 for arriving at the laboratory
on time.
2.2 Strategies
Stahl and Wilson (1995) proposed a theory of boundedly rational types, based on a hierarchical
model by Nagel (1993). Stahl and Wilson assume that players di⁄er in their level of strategic
sophistication. Their model classi￿es players into types according to their level of reasoning. A
level-0 type randomizes uniformly over his strategy space, whereas a level-k type best responds to
level-(k ￿ 1) behavior for k 2 f1;2;::;1g, hence the term level-k model.7
The level-k model is a useful approach to track o⁄-equilibrium behavior. It has been tested
and extended by various other studies mainly in the context of normal-form games (e.g. Costa-
Gomes et al., 2001, Costa-Gomes and Weizs￿cker, 2008, Rey-Biel, forthcoming or Camerer et al.,
2004). It is also successful in organizing data from other games such as auctions, as recently shown
by Crawford and Iriberri (2007a, 2007b) as well as Gneezy (2005). The most common types found
in normal-form games are level-1 (L1), level-2 (L2) and Nash types, but their distribution crucially
depends on the set of games investigated.
All above mentioned studies on normal-form games focus on one-shot interactions. In a
repeated setting, additional strategic considerations come into play, and learning becomes possible.
The level-k model can accommodate learning by inducing subjects to play higher-level strategies.
Suppose a subject starts out by playing the L1 action, but then learns to best respond to L1 by
playing L2 and so forth. Thus, a subject can learn by updating his beliefs in the course of the
game, and we will investigate this on the basis of our data. In particular, we will test whether the
subjects￿beliefs become more accurate in predicting the opponents￿behavior over time.
We use the level-k model to classify the available strategies in our game (see Table 3).
The most important types of the level-k model (L1, L2 and Nash) can be grouped into two broad
7The model contains also other types to capture behavior eventually more in line with traditional game theory.
These are the naive Nash type who chooses the Nash equilibrium strategy, the wordly type who plays a best response to
a subjective distribution of all other types and the rational expectation type who correctly anticipates the distribution
of boundedly rational types and best responds to this distribution.
8Row player Column player
Top Nash(L2) Left Nash
Middle L1 Center L1(L2)
Bottom Rawls Right Rawls
Table 3: Decision rules
categories, namely strategic and non-strategic types. Strategic types form beliefs based on an
analysis of what others do and best respond to these beliefs, whereas non-strategic types do not
take into account the incentives of others. Given this de￿nition, strategic types are L2 and Nash
and the non-strategic type is L1.
We also introduce a Rawlsian decision rule, de￿ned as choosing the action that maximizes
the payo⁄ of the player with the lower payo⁄, given that the other player has the same objective
and chooses accordingly. Remember that in the game we use, the Rawls strategy is the same as the
Utilitarian strategy which maximizes the sum of payo⁄s. With our de￿nition of strategic behavior,
the Rawls action is strategic because it requires the belief that the other player has the same
preferences and acts accordingly (the same reasoning holds for its interpretation as a Utilitarian
rule). Previous studies did not explicitly explore Rawlsian or Utilitarian strategies, but some of
them found behavior pointing in this direction (e.g. Costa-Gomes and Weizs￿cker, 2008). The
game we used, depicted in Figure 1, allows us to separate between Nash play and play of the most
e¢ cient and/or fair outcome.8
The main focus of this study is on the development of strategic and non-strategic behavior
over time. We therefore chose a game that allows us to identify strategic and non-strategic behavior
as clearly as possible. In particular our interest was to achieve the best possible separation of the
four rules of behavior (L1, L2, Rawls and Nash). We chose an asymmetric game for which the
di⁄erent rules overlap di⁄erently for the two player roles (see Table 3). Only the L2 rule cannot be
identi￿ed clearly for any of the two player roles. For the row player, it prescribes the same action
as Nash and for the column player it is the same as L1. Assuming that there is a considerable
proportion of L2 play, which is suggested by previous studies, we will overestimate the proportion
of Nash play of the row player and the proportion of L1 play of the column player. We will
keep this in mind when interpreting the ￿ndings. However, our focus is on subjects learning to
8In contrast, Ehrblatt et al. (2008) run a similar experiment based on a game where the Nash equilibrium coincides
with the Rawlsian/ Utilitarian outcome.
9play strategically, and the L2 rule represents an intermediate level of strategic reasoning. We are
mainly interested in the comparison between L1 and Nash behavior as the two extreme ends of the
spectrum of strategic play.
Notice that we use the names L1, Nash and Rawls also for the three strategies in treat-
ment PI even though a priori the subjects cannot reason about the other player￿ s incentives and
consequently cannot identify the Nash and the Rawls strategy in this treatment.9
3 Results
In the ￿rst part of the analysis, we examine the choices made by the experimental subjects. We
begin this analysis with a focus on ￿rst period behavior and a comparison of these results to previous
experiments. Afterwards we extend our analysis to all periods and focus on the development of
behavior over time, considering the impact of the information available. In the second part of
the data analysis, we make use of the elicited beliefs. After con￿rming that the stated beliefs
outperform beliefs constructed with standard models of belief formation, we examine the frequency
of best responses to the stated beliefs. Furthermore we check the accuracy of the stated beliefs
in predicting the opponent￿ s choice as well as the role of feedback and payo⁄ information for the
formation of beliefs.
Note that unlike in most other studies on asymmetric one-shot games (e.g. Costa-Gomes and
Weizs￿cker, 2008), we do not pool the data over player roles. As we study only one speci￿c game,
we are able to consider the exact strategic situation of each player role. This di⁄erentiation would
be lost by pooling the data. Thus, we run all statistical tests separately for row and for column
players. All results reported as signi￿cant in the paper are based on a 5%-level of signi￿cance.
3.1 Choices
3.1.1 First-period choices
In this section, we look at behavior in the ￿rst period only. This is of some stand-alone interest,
since many experiments on behavior in one-shot 3x3 normal-form games have used similar games,
and we can compare our results to them. First-period behavior in the four treatments is presented
9However, if the subjective game constructed by the participants happens to be equivalent to the true game, the
















BASE RM NF PI
Nash L1 Rawls
Row Player Column Player
Figure 1: First period choices
in Figure 1. The ￿gure shows the fraction of each action in a given treatment for row players and
column players, respectively.
In the ￿rst period, subjects in treatments BASE, RM and NF all face the same strategic
situation. Therefore we should not observe any di⁄erences in behavior in the ￿rst period. This
is clearly the case, as can be taken from Figure 1. The frequency of chosen strategies of the row
players (column players) in all three treatments is 19 (8) percent Nash, 43 (64) percent L1 and
38 (28) percent Rawls. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the frequency of strategies is the
same in these three treatments using a ￿2-Test.10 Our ￿nding of 53% L1 behavior in the ￿rst
period in BASE, RM and NF is in line with previous studies.11 For instance, Costa-Gomes et al.
(2001) estimated a L1 rate of about 45%, Rey-Biel (forthcoming) found 48% L1 behavior in his
constant-sum games, whereas Costa-Gomes and Weizs￿cker (2008) found slightly higher rates of
about 60%.
Now, consider the decision situation in the ￿rst period of treatment PI. Subjects only know
their own payo⁄s in the game and therefore cannot base their decisions on strategic considerations.
Hence, it is no surprise to see 39 out of 48 subjects (81%) choosing the L1 rule in period 1 in PI,
which not only maximizes the minimum payo⁄, but also the expected payo⁄ assuming that the
opponent randomizes uniformly over all possible actions. Concerning the column player￿ s choice of
the dominated action Right (Rawls), violations of dominance only occur in treatments BASE, RM
and NF. It is remarkable that no column player in PI chooses Rawls in the ￿rst period, indicating
that the choice of dominated actions in the other treatments is due to the payo⁄ structure of the
10For both player roles we perform a pairwise comparison of BASE with NF and RM, respectively. The test yields
no p-value smaller than 0:64 (￿
2
(2)).
11For ease of comparison with other studies, we pool L1 behavior over player roles.
11other player and not only to mistakes. The frequency of the three strategies in PI is signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from BASE in the ￿rst period for both player roles (￿2
(2); p = 0:043 for row players and
p = 0:014 for column players). We summarize the ￿ndings on choices in the ￿rst period in the
following result.
Result 1 (i) First-period behavior in BASE, RM and NF is statistically indistinguishable from
each other and comparable to ￿ndings from one-shot experiments. (ii) L1 is the most frequently
chosen strategy in the ￿rst period in all treatments and for both player roles. (iii) First-period play
in treatment PI is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from BASE.
3.1.2 Choices over all periods
To give a ￿rst impression of how subjects play the game in the di⁄erent treatments, Figure 2
presents the proportion of the behavioral rules over time for each treatment. The ￿gure shows
averages over three periods in a given treatment for row players in the left panel and for column
players in the right panel. It emerges from the graphs that the frequency of the behavioral rules
di⁄ers in the various treatments and for the two player roles.12 To study these di⁄erences, we run
a number of regressions, summarized in Table 4.
First, we consider average behavior over all 20 periods in the di⁄erent treatments. For
this purpose, we perform a separate regression for each strategy and player role combination. We
regress the strategies on treatment dummies without controlling for time e⁄ects, which gives us
a ￿rst indication of the in￿ uence of the di⁄erent information conditions. To model the repeated
decisions of the same subject in each treatment, we use random-e⁄ects panel regressions. Since
subjects had to choose one out of three possible strategies, a probit model is employed where the
dependent variable re￿ ects the inclination to choose one strategy over the other two.
The results of the regressions without time trends, shown in the odd-numbered columns in
Table 4, reveal the importance of information about the opponent￿ s payo⁄ and of feedback about
past choices. The coe¢ cients of PI are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from BASE for all strategies except
for the Nash strategy of the row player. In particular, there is signi￿cantly more L1 play and less
Rawls play in PI than in BASE. In addition, the lack of feedback in NF results in more L1 play
than in BASE for both player roles and less Rawls play for column players. Similar but weaker
12As stated above, we cannot clearly identify L2 behavior, since this rule overlaps with Nash for row players and
with L1 for column players (see also Table 3). A certain proportion of L2 play may therefore be the reason why we
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14e⁄ects can be observed in RM where the only signi￿cant di⁄erence to BASE is that L1 choices of
the column player are more frequent.
To investigate potential learning paths, we extend our regressions by including a time trend
and interaction terms for treatment with time. The results of these regressions are presented in
the even-numbered columns in Table 4. In these regressions the dummy variables are coded such
that the corresponding coe¢ cients represent the intercept and the development over time in each
treatment relative to the baseline treatment. In order to assess the absolute time trends in each
treatment, we additionally test the hypothesis that the sum of the coe¢ cient for Period and the
relevant coe¢ cient for Treatment*Period is equal to zero (see Appendix A.1)
First, let us focus on the development of the three strategies in BASE. The coe¢ cient of
Period shows that in BASE subjects tend to choose the L1 strategy less often in later periods
while Nash play increases and Rawls choices are more or less stable over time. We can compare
this learning path to the time trend in treatment PI. The inclusion of time controls reveals that
behavior in PI changes in a similar way as in BASE, with an even stronger decrease of L1 play for
the column player. The average di⁄erence in the choices between the BASE and the PI treatment
is therefore mainly due to di⁄erences in initial play.
Now consider treatment NF. Although the removal of feedback in treatment NF does not
produce signi￿cant di⁄erences in the time trend compared to BASE, the time trends in NF are so
small that they are no longer signi￿cant when tested directly (see Table A.1). Finally, we compare
the e⁄ect of random matching compared to ￿xed matching on the time trend. While we do not
￿nd di⁄erences between RM and BASE for row players over time, column players in RM choose
Rawls less often and L1 more often than in BASE. This is consistent with the fact that reputation
building is not possible in RM, and a deviation from Rawls to L1 which gives a higher payo⁄cannot
be sanctioned e⁄ectively by the row player.
The ￿ndings based on the various regressions can be summarized as follows.
Result 2 (i) In treatment BASE there is signi￿cantly less L1 and more Rawls play than in PI
and NF. (ii) Over time the proportion of the Nash strategy increases in all treatments and for both
player roles except in NF. (iii) The proportion of the L1 strategy decreases over time in BASE
(row player) and PI (both player roles). There is no similar time trend in NF. (iv) The proportion
of Rawls choices is almost constant over time for all treatments and player roles (except for the
column player in RM).
15Thus, in the sense of Stahl and Wilson we observe a trend towards more strategic play
(that is more Nash and less L1 play) in all treatments with feedback information. There is an
increase in Nash and a decrease in L1 play in BASE and PI. In PI, the overall lower proportion
of strategic behavior compared to BASE can be ascribed to the lack of information about the
opponent￿ s payo⁄s. However, the fact that players in PI can observe the choices of their opponent
over time and react to these observations leads to a development of behavior away from the L1
rule, just as in BASE. In treatment NF behavior does not change over time. As the NF treatment
is comparable to a repeated one-shot situation, this ￿nding lends support to the frequently applied
method of giving no feedback between di⁄erent tasks in experiments in order to minimize learning
e⁄ects. Finally, as our control for repeated game e⁄ects, treatment RM reveals no di⁄erences to
BASE for the row player. But we observe that the column player￿ s behavior is a⁄ected by the
matching protocol in that she chooses on average more non-strategic L1 play in RM than in BASE.
And over time she is less likely to choose the dominated strategy (Rawls) in RM compared to
BASE, probably due to a lack of repeated-game e⁄ects.
3.2 Belief formation
In this section, we focus on the relationship between the elicited beliefs and the subjects￿own as
well as their opponents￿actions. In standard equilibrium analysis it is assumed that subjects form
beliefs about the behavior of the opponent and then best respond to these beliefs. The level-k
model departs from this view by positing that subjects di⁄er in their strategic sophistication when
thinking about the behavior of other players, i.e., they di⁄er in their beliefs (Stahl and Wilson,
1995). In particular, level-1 behavior implies that beliefs are naive in that uniform randomization
by the opponent is assumed. Level-2 types hold the belief that others best respond to uniform
randomization. Thus, we can use belief statements to measure the level of strategic sophistication
and to track the development of strategic thinking over time.
There are some caveats concerning the elicitation of beliefs. First, subjects need not hold
beliefs about the opponent￿ s play at all. For example, they might choose some non-strategic decision
rule in the ￿rst period and then condition play on received payo⁄s (as in reinforcement learning).
Forcing them to state beliefs could alter the choices if these subjects move their decisions in the
direction of belief-based play.13 However, our design is based on a comparison between treatments
which all use belief elicitation. Unless the e⁄ects of belief elicitation interact with our treatment
13See Rutstr￿m and Wilcox (2006) for an argument along these lines.
16variables, our results are immune to such problems. More importantly, the assumption of best-
responses to beliefs in decision theory can be understood as an "as if" assumption. With this
interpretation, subjects do not necessarily have to best respond to their stated beliefs as these beliefs
might be unrelated to the true underlying beliefs. In order to address this concern, we compare
the stated beliefs to beliefs constructed from previous play of the opponent. The stated beliefs
emerge as a better predictor of actual choices than the constructed beliefs, which lends support
to the hypothesis that the elicited beliefs are good approximations of the true underlying beliefs.
Also, subjects might make mistakes when stating their beliefs, just as when taking decisions. We
therefore propose that the belief statements should only be taken as a proxy of the true underlying
beliefs of subjects.14 Finally, even though we asked explicitly to state myopic beliefs, i.e. beliefs
only for the current period, we cannot rule out that subjects follow repeated-game strategies and
hold beliefs consistent with this. As the choices that are part of repeated-game strategies are not
necessarily best responses to myopic beliefs, we will use treatment RM to check for repeated-game
e⁄ects.
3.2.1 Stated beliefs vs. models of belief formation
We follow the approach used in Nyarko and Schotter (2002) and compare the explanatory power
of elicited beliefs compared to standard belief learning models. The purpose of this comparison is
to establish whether stated beliefs are a good measure of strategic uncertainty or whether stated
beliefs are inferior to beliefs derived indirectly from the opponents￿choices.
Standard belief learning models assume that players update their beliefs based on the op-
ponent￿ s history of play and then best-respond to these beliefs. The two most prominent models
based on this assumption are the ￿ctitious-play and the Cournot best-response model. While in
the Cournot model subjects best respond to the opponent￿ s play in the very last period, players in
a pure ￿ctitious-play model best respond to beliefs based on all previous actions of the opponent.
The ￿-weighted ￿ctitious-play model introduced by Cheung and Friedman (1997) contains Cournot
best response and ￿ctitious-play as special cases. In this model subject i￿ s belief bk
i;t+1 that subject
j will choose action ak














The parameter ￿i is the weight player i gives to the past actions of his opponent. It is obvious
14See Costa-Gomes and Weizs￿cker (2008) for a thorough analysis of belief statements.
17from (2) that ￿i = 0 leads to the Cournot best-response model and ￿i = 1 yields ￿ctitious-play,
respectively. We incorporate this model into a standard logistic choice model to allow subjects to



















it;bit] is the expected payo⁄ of player i when she chooses an action k given her beliefs bit
over the action set of her opponent. The parameter ￿ determines the impact of this expected payo⁄
on her own choice probability and can be interpreted as a rationality parameter. A player with
￿ = 0 chooses all actions with equal probability disregarding the expected payo⁄ of her choice. On
the other hand if ￿ ! 1 the player is fully rational, i.e. she always best responds to her beliefs.
We now turn to the estimation and probabilistic comparison of the choice model (3) based
on the ￿-weighted ￿ctitious-play model (2) on the one hand and on the stated beliefs on the other
hand. Since the belief-learning model assumes that subjects process only information about their
own payo⁄s and about the history of their opponent￿ s play, we only use the data of treatments
BASE and PI in the following analysis, while we do not consider treatment NF. We also analyze
the data from treatment RM, since the process described in (2) can also be interpreted as the
formation of beliefs over the average play of the population rather than over individual choices.
The estimation results for each treatment and player role are presented in Table 5.15
As a ￿rst result we observe that the stated beliefs play a signi￿cant role in explaining the
behavior of our subjects, since appropriate likelihood-ratio tests reject the hypothesis that the
rationality parameter ￿ is equal to zero (p = 0:00 for all treatments and player roles).
Using tests for the selection between non-nested models introduced by Vuong (1989) and
Clarke (2003), the hypothesis of equal explanatory power of the models can be rejected at all usual
signi￿cance levels for all treatments and player roles, the only exception being the column player in
the random-matching treatment.16 In our notation the negative signs of the test statistics reveal
15For the ￿-weighted ￿ctitious-play model we estimated ￿ and ￿ simultaneously. All ML-estimations and tests have
been conducted with MATLAB and R.
16Vuong￿ s test statistic is based on the overall likelihood ratio of two rival models and is asymptotically normally
distributed under the null. Clarke￿ s test statistic consists of the number of single likelihood ratios being greater than
1 which is binomially distributed under the null with parameters ￿ = 0:5 and the number of observations in each
subset of the data. Vuong￿ s test is outperformed by Clarke￿ s test when the distribution of the single log-likelihood
ratios is highly peaked. Both tests were calculated using corrections for the dimension of the models as proposed by
Schwarz (1978) and Clarke (2007) respectively.
18ML-estimation of model (3) using Model selection tests
Fictitious play (2) Stated beliefs Vuong￿ s test Clarke￿ s test
Treatment Role ￿ ￿ logL ￿ logL Z p-value Z p-value
BASE row 0.0575 0.7418 -484.01 0.1005 -422.12 -3.46 0.0005 -9.12 0.0000
column 0.0373 0.6009 -492.96 0.0586 -421.93 -6.88 0.0000 -5.42 0.0000
PI row 0.0442 0.6488 -487.68 0.0646 -451.16 -3.72 0.0002 -3.47 0.0005
column 0.0571 0.6220 -413.59 0.1066 -307.98 -5.82 0.0000 -14.97 0.0000
RM row 0.0233 0.5821 -427.04 0.0825 -372.34 -5.35 0.0000 -5.90 0.0000
column 0.0729 0.9067 -350.21 0.0604 -334.25 -1.42 0.1548 -1.30 0.1936
Notes: p-values are two-sided. Clarke￿ s corrected B has been approximated by the standard normal
distribution.
Table 5: Model Estimation and Selection.
that the stated belief model is closer to the real data generating process than the beliefs generated
by the belief-learning models.
To summarize, we extend the ￿nding of Nyarko and Schotter (2002) from a matching-
pennies game to our normal-form game with a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. We ￿nd that stated beliefs are better at explaining observed choices than beliefs that are
implied by the standard models of belief formation. In the following, we therefore use the stated
beliefs when analyzing the impact of experience and information on the consistency and accuracy
of beliefs.
3.2.2 Consistency of actions and stated beliefs
Both in standard Nash equilibrium and in the level-k model it is assumed that subjects best respond
to their beliefs. Using the elicited beliefs, we can investigate the consistency of actions and stated
beliefs, i.e. whether subjects best respond to their stated beliefs. This helps us to evaluate the
relative descriptive validity of both models in the four di⁄erent treatments.
In Figure 3 the proportion of players best responding to their stated beliefs is displayed
for each player role and treatment separately. The ￿gure shows the average proportion of best
responses over three periods. In all treatments, the average best response rates are rather low,
ranging from 45% to 75%. In order to compare our results to other studies, it is useful to look
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Games various 3x3 various 3x3 two 3x3 one 2x2 one 3x3
Interaction one-shot one-shot repeated repeated repeated
￿ 54 69 49 75 63
Table 6: Best-response rates (in %) in various studies
roles, subjects best-respond to their stated beliefs in 63% of the cases. The best-response rates
found in similar studies are summarized in Table 6. In simple games like 2x2 games (Nyarko and
Schotter, 2002) or constant-sum games (Rey-Biel, forthcoming) consistency rates are about 70%,
whereas the rates range from 49% to 63% in more complicated games like ours or the games used
in Costa-Gomes and Weizs￿cker (2008) and Ehrblatt et al.(2008), respectively.
For statistical evidence on di⁄erences between the treatments and the development of best-
response rates over time, we run random-e⁄ects panel regressions. As the dependent variable is
either 0 (no best response) or 1 (best response), we use a probit model. Besides the constant,
the independent variables are dummies for PI, NF and RM, a linear time trend and interaction
dummies for time trend and treatment. The regression results are summarized in Table 7. Again,
we run additional direct tests of the absolute time trends in the control treatments (see Appendix
A.2).
Due to the asymmetry of the game and in particular due to the fact that only the column
20Best-response rates
row player column player

























































log L -1160.74 -1152.70 -1008.56 -1002.94
￿2
(3)=￿2
(7) 6.48￿ 22.13￿￿￿ 11.22￿￿ 22.09￿￿￿
N 1920 1920
Notes: Random-e⁄ects probit regressions,
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
Table 7: Regressions: Best-response rates
21player has a dominated strategy, it is necessary to di⁄erentiate between the row and the column
player in this section. First we investigate whether subjects learn to best respond in BASE in the
course of the experiment. The signi￿cant and positive coe¢ cient of Period reveals that this is the
case for the row player. There is a positive trend also for the column player, but it fails to be
signi￿cant.
In what follows, we will compare each control treatment with BASE separately, starting
with PI. For the row player, the average number of best responses in BASE is slightly higher than
the number of best responses in PI. The opposite holds for the column player which is due to less
Rawls play in PI (as the Rawls strategy cannot be identi￿ed in PI), thereby avoiding violation of
dominance. Using direct tests for the time trends, there is no signi￿cant development over time
for both player roles in PI. When comparing BASE to NF the overall level of best responses is
again higher in BASE than in NF for the row player and lower for the column player (because the
dominated Rawls strategy is played less often in NF than in BASE). As in PI, the time trends in
NF are not signi￿cant when tested directly. Aside from the row players in BASE, only the column
players in RM display higher best-response rates in later periods (the time trend of column players
in RM is signi￿cant when using a direct test).
These ￿ndings raise the question why the best-response rates of the row player are higher in
BASE compared to treatments PI and NF. Internal consistency requires best responding to one￿ s
beliefs, independent of the information conditions. We can merely o⁄er potential explanations
of our observations, but further research is necessary to disentangle the causes of behavior more
thoroughly. In treatment NF, subjects might be doubtful about the accuracy of their beliefs, lacking
information about the other player￿ s behavior. This might induce them to put less weight on their
beliefs when choosing an action. But this reasoning fails to explain the similar result in treatment
PI where there is also no discernible increase in best-response behavior. In PI, players have to learn
about the structure of the game over time. Two possible explanations come to mind. First, the
complexity of learning both the structure of the game and of best responding to one￿ s beliefs at
the same time may be too high. Second, in treatment PI many subjects start with uniform beliefs
and best respond to them. As the belief set of L1 is large and L1 is an attractive strategy initially,
there is a high rate of consistency at the outset. This e⁄ect is absent in BASE and NF.
The focus of the preceding analysis was on myopic beliefs. However, in our repeated-game
setting, Folk Theorem results are possible. If subjects aim at a cooperative outcome, column players
might choose their dominated action (Rawls) in response to Rawls play of row players. A necessary
22condition for a repeated-game strategy is the observability of past behavior such that subjects can
condition their actions on their opponents￿play. To achieve a cooperative outcome a minimum of
information is needed to allow for sanctions of deviations.17 As mentioned before, the fact that the
choice of Rawls by the column player can never be a best response to any myopic belief explains why
we observe very low best-response rates for column players in BASE compared to NF and PI where
less Rawls play is observed. If the low best-response rates are indeed a result of repeated-game
strategies, we should observe signi￿cantly higher best-response rates in RM. The reason is that the
￿nite time horizon and the random-matching protocol do not allow for cooperation based on the
Folk theorem. But we observe a substantial proportion of Rawls play also in RM in both player
roles. Moreover, the regressions reveal no signi￿cant di⁄erences between BASE and RM neither
for the overall proportion of Rawls play (see Table 4) nor for the average best response rates (see
Table 7).
The insigni￿cant di⁄erence of best response rates in BASE and RM could be due to a higher
number of failures to best respond to undominated actions in RM, which would push best-response
rates down in the direction of BASE. But this is not the case. When considering only the best-
response behavior to Nash and L1, we ￿nd best response rates of about 92% in BASE and 88%
in RM. We can further support this ￿nding of equal best-response rates in BASE and RM by a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test which compares the number of best responses to Nash and L1 of each
subject. The test yields a p-value of p > 0:88.18 For these reasons we consider the evidence for
repeated-game strategies as weak.
Result 3 (i) Row player: The best-response rates in PI and NF are on average signi￿cantly lower
than in BASE. While the proportion of best responses increases over time in BASE, there is no
signi￿cant time trend in all other treatments. (ii) Column player: Best-response rates are overall
higher in treatments NF and PI than in BASE. This di⁄erence disappears when restricting attention
to undominated actions. There is no signi￿cant time trend for any treatment except RM. (iii) For
both player roles, treatments BASE and RM do not signi￿cantly di⁄er from each other with respect
to overall best-response rates.
Interpreting the stated beliefs as proxies for the true underlying beliefs, we can conclude that
17For instance, Ellison (1994) and Kandori (1992) have shown for in￿nitely repeated games with random matching
that a cooperative outcome is possible through contagious sanctions.
18We use each column player as an independent observation and compare the empirical distribution of the number
of best responses to Nash and L1 between BASE and RM.
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Figure 4: Accuracy of stated beliefs
actors best respond more often to their beliefs in repeated games with feedback information and
information about the game structure with some experience of the situation, compared to situations
with less information and experience. Best-response rates are low when there is a dominated action
leading to the Pareto-e¢ cient outcome.19
3.2.3 Accuracy of stated beliefs
We will now focus on whether the elicited beliefs are accurate in predicting the behavior of the
opponents. The accuracy of beliefs is also a measure of strategic uncertainty. Subjects who hold
accurate beliefs about opponent￿ s behavior do not experience strategic uncertainty. The baseline
treatment together with the control treatments allow us to identify the factors enabling subjects
to reduce strategic uncertainty and to state accurate beliefs. In addition, the predicted accuracy of
beliefs is di⁄erent in the Nash equilibrium prediction and the level-k model. In the Nash equilibrium
of the stage game, subjects hold accurate beliefs about their opponent￿ s choice. In the level-k model,
however, this is typically not the case as subjects￿beliefs can be at odds with their opponents￿
behavior. In order to measure how well stated beliefs predict the opponent￿ s play, we use the
earnings from the quadratic scoring rule (QSR). Figure 4 shows the average earnings over three
periods from the QSR for all treatments and for both player roles.20
19Of course, the strategy may not be dominated for other speci￿cations of the utility function. However, in this
paper we restrict attention to payo⁄s representing utilities.
20In principle, the accuracy of predicting other￿ s behavior should not depend on the player role. Indeed, we only ￿nd
a weakly signi￿cant di⁄erence between player roles in RM (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:098). In all other treatments
24The average payo⁄ across treatments and player roles is about e 1.21 This corresponds to
the payo⁄ for subjects who state uniform beliefs, which is indicated by the vertical line in Figure 4.
The second benchmark to which we can compare the earnings is e 0:5; representing the expected
payo⁄ from randomizing uniformly over degenerate beliefs. Although subjects earn hardly more
than e 1; their beliefs are much better than in the case where they simply try to predict the
choice of their opponent with a probability of one (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, all p-values < 0:01).
How can the belief statements be further characterized? We do not observe many uniform belief
statements (see also footnote 5). Although 49% of all belief statements assign a positive probability
to each action, only a fraction of 7.5% submit uniform beliefs. About 21% of the belief statements
assign a positive probability to two of the actions, and 30% of the statements are degenerate. Row
players in BASE and PI earn on average more than e 1 and in NF and RM they earn less than e 1.
But we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal means at a 5% level of signi￿cance for all treatments
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-values > 0:085). The same holds for column players in BASE and PI,
but column players in NF and RM earn on average signi￿cantly less than e 1 (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, for NF and RM p-values < 0:01).
Figure 4 displays improvements over time in predicting the play of the opponent in treat-
ments BASE and PI. Apparently, this is not the case for treatments NF and RM. We run a
random-e⁄ects panel regression where the dependent variable is the payo⁄ from the belief elicita-
tion task. In addition to the constant and a reference time trend for BASE, the regression includes
treatment and time interaction dummies for the controls PI, NF and RM as independent variables
in order to measure the corresponding performance relative to BASE. Again, direct tests of the
absolute time trends in the control treatments were performed separately (see Appendix A.3).
Averaged over all periods, beliefs are signi￿cantly less accurate in NF than in BASE while
PI and BASE show the same accuracy of beliefs. When comparing BASE to RM, only the column
players di⁄er signi￿cantly due to a lower accuracy of beliefs in RM than in BASE. Focusing on the
development over time, we observe some learning in BASE since the beliefs become more accurate
over time for the column players. We observe the same pattern over time in PI as in BASE. But for
treatments NF and RM, tests of the absolute time trends reveal that there is no learning. Finally,
the row players show no signi￿cant learning path in any treatment.
The ￿ndings can be summarized as follows:
the same test yields p-values higher than 0:45.
21The average payo⁄ across player roles is in BASE e 1.07, in PI e 1.02, in NF e 0.89 and in RM e 0.91.
25Payment for belief task
row player column player



























































(7) 6.84￿ 15.60￿￿ 17.61￿￿￿ 55.56￿￿￿
R2 0.07 0.07 0.16 0.16
N 1920
Notes: Random-e⁄ects regressions,
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
Table 8: Regressions: Accuracy of stated beliefs
26Result 4 (i) In treatments BASE and PI, behavior is characterized by the same learning path. The
column player￿ s beliefs are more accurate in later periods while the row players do not display any
learning. (ii) Overall, the beliefs are signi￿cantly less accurate in NF than in BASE since there is
no learning at all in NF. (iii) While for the row player the accuracy of beliefs is the same in RM
as in BASE over all periods, the column players in RM exhibit less accurate beliefs on average.
The results indicate that feedback about past behavior of one￿ s opponent is more important
for reducing strategic uncertainty than information about the strategic incentives of one￿ s opponent.
Without feedback or with noisy feedback because the opponent is not the same in each period, it
is di¢ cult to predict one￿ s opponent￿ s behavior. Further support for the relatively minor role of
information about the structure of the game comes from the fact, displayed in Figure 4, that in
the ￿rst periods beliefs are not signi￿cantly less accurate in PI than in BASE. The observed low
accuracy of beliefs is an indicator for the strategic uncertainty in all treatments. However, we see
that in the treatments with feedback (BASE and PI) the accuracy of beliefs is not only higher than
in NF and RM, but it also increases over time. The non-signi￿cance of the time trend of the row
players in BASE is mainly due to the large drop of the accuracy of beliefs in the last two periods.22
This drop is associated with the deviation from Rawls of almost all column players in the last two
periods which was not anticipated by the row players.
4 Summary and Conclusions
We have performed an experiment to study the development of strategic reasoning over a limited
number of periods. To classify the strategies of the 3x3 normal-form game employed in our study,
we used the level-of-reasoning model of Stahl and Wilson (1995). This classi￿cation allowed us to
track strategic play over time. In order to understand the determinants of strategic play, we varied
the information available to the players and elicited their beliefs about opponents￿play.
We ￿nd that feedback information and information about the payo⁄s of the opponent have
an impact on choices. When either type of information is lacking, this leads to an increase in
non-strategic (L1) and a decrease in Rawls play on average. However, not revealing the opponent￿ s
payo⁄ function has almost no impact on the learning path compared to the baseline treatment. In
both treatments (BASE and PI), subjects exhibit less non-strategic and more Nash play over time.
22If we exclude the last two periods in regression (2) and (4) in Table 8, the coe¢ cients of period are signi￿cantly
positive for BASE and signi￿cantly negative for NF and RM.
27In contrast, in the no-feedback treatment there is no increase in strategic play in the course of
the experiment. This fact clearly highlights the importance of feedback and the limits of strategic
sophistication of the subjects.
Regarding the analysis of beliefs, we ￿rst evaluate whether stated beliefs or beliefs con-
structed with belief-learning models are a better proxy for the underlying true beliefs of the subjects.
We ￿nd that the stated beliefs are more consistent with actual choices than beliefs constructed with
belief models such as weighted ￿ctitious play or Cournot best response. Given this result, we study
the best-response rates to the stated beliefs. In the baseline treatment, actions are consistent with
stated beliefs more frequently in later periods (signi￿cant for the row players). Missing informa-
tion about the opponent￿ s payo⁄ function or no feedback destroys this trend towards more best
responses in later periods.
The accuracy of the subjects￿beliefs with respect to the opponent￿ s choices is increasing over
time in the baseline treatment (this is signi￿cant for column players). Surprisingly, removing the
information about the opponent￿ s payo⁄ function does not decrease the overall accuracy of beliefs
nor its development over time in a signi￿cant manner. However, without feedback information
about the other player￿ s past actions, the overall accuracy of beliefs is signi￿cantly lower, and
players do not make any improvements in predicting the other player￿ s behavior.
This study should be seen as a ￿rst step in understanding the development of strategic
thinking with the help of stated beliefs in a game. Many issues remain to be investigated. For
example, other games should be used in order to be able abstract from the speci￿cs of our game.
Also, the accuracy and consistency of beliefs over time is by now very little understood and in our
view deserves thorough empirical scrutiny.
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30A APPENDIX
A.1 Tests for absolute time trends of choices





















































































































logL -977.66 -908.25 -978.62 -801.85 -1147.71 -795.93
N 1920 1920
Notes: Random-e⁄ects probit regression, standard errors in parentheses,
* signi￿cant at 10-percent level; ** signi￿cant at 5-percent level; *** signi￿cant at 1-percent level.
Table A.1: Regressions: Decision rules with absolute time trends.
31A.2 Tests for absolute time trends of best-response rates
Best-response rates









































log L -1152.70 -1002.94
N 1920 1920
Notes: Random-e⁄ects probit regression,
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
Table A.2: Regressions: Best-response rates with absolute time trends.
32A.3 Tests for absolute time trends of the accuracy of beliefs
Payment in belief task









































log L -1290.10 -1236.34
N 1920 1920
Notes: Random-e⁄ects regressions,
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
Table A.3: Regressions: Accuracy of stated beliefs with absolute time trends.
33A.4 Instructions (for BASE)
The experiment you are about to participate in is part of a project ￿nanced by the German
Research Foundation (DFG). Its aim is to analyze economic decision-making behavior. You can
earn a considerable amount of money in this experiment, dependent on your decisions and the
decisions of the other participants. Consequently, it is extremely important that you read these
instructions very carefully.
Please note: these instructions are for your eyes only, and it is not permitted to hand on any
information whatsoever to other participants. Similarly, you are not allowed to speak to the other
participants throughout the whole experiment. Should you have a question, please raise your hand
and we will come to you and answer your question individually. Please do not ask your question(s)
aloud. If you break these rules, we will unfortunately be compelled to discontinue the experiment.
General information The experiment is made up of several rounds where decisions must be
made and questions answered. You can win points with your decisions. These points represent
your earnings and will be converted into euros at the end of the game and paid out in cash. The
exact procedure of the experiment, the various decisions and the method of payment are clearly
explained in the next section.
The decision-making situation At the beginning of the experiment, you will be assigned by
draw to another participant, randomly and anonymously. This allocation is maintained throughout
the whole of the remaining experiment. The participant who has been assigned to you will be called
￿the other one￿from now on.
In each round, you and the other one will be confronted with the same decision-making
situation. Each time, you must choose between the three alternatives: ￿top￿ , ￿middle￿ , and
￿bottom￿ .
Each of these three alternatives has been given three possible payo⁄s (as points). The other
one must also decide between three alternatives (￿left￿ , ￿center￿ or ￿right￿ ), and each of these
alternatives has also three possible payo⁄s, as above. You will see the following input screen on the
computer:
34Your three alternatives, ￿top￿ , ￿middle￿ , and ￿bottom￿ , are listed in the ￿rst column of the
table. Next to your alternatives, you can see three boxes, each with two numbers. The subscript
(lower) number is always your possible payo⁄. On the input screen illustrated above, the alternative
￿top￿has been allocated the payo⁄ of 78, 72 and 12, the alternative ￿middle￿the payo⁄ of 67, 59
and 78, and the alternative ￿bottom￿the payo⁄ of 21, 62 and 89. This means that should you
decide on ￿top￿ , for example, then your payo⁄ is 78, 72 or 12 points. The payo⁄ you actually
receive depends on whether the other one selects ￿left￿ , ￿center￿ or ￿right￿ . Thus your payo⁄
depends on your own decision as well as that of the other one. The superscript (raised) number
in any box is always the possible payo⁄ of the other one. For example, if the other one decides on
￿left￿ , then his/her possible payo⁄ points are 68, 52 and 11. This means, for example, that if you
decide on ￿middle￿and the other one decides on ￿right￿ , your payo⁄ is 78 points. The payo⁄ for
the other one is 49 points in this case.
The possible payo⁄ points on the input screen above are therefore as follows:
35You choose ￿top￿ ; the other one chooses ￿left￿ :
Your payo⁄ is: 78 points
The payo⁄ for the other one is: 68 points
You choose ￿top￿ ; the other one chooses ￿center￿
Your payo⁄ is: 72 points
The payo⁄ for the other one is: 23 points
You choose ￿top￿ ; the other one chooses ￿right￿ :
Your payo⁄ is: 12 points
The payo⁄ for the other one is: 20 points
You choose ￿middle￿ ; the other one chooses ￿left￿ :
Your payo⁄ is: 67 points
The payo⁄ for the other one is: 52 points
You choose ￿middle￿ ; the other one chooses ￿center￿ :
Your payo⁄ is: 59 points
The payo⁄ for the other one is: 63 points
You choose ￿middle￿ ; the other one chooses ￿right￿ :
Your payo⁄ is: 78 points
The payo⁄ for the other one is: 49 points
You choose ￿bottom￿ ; the other one chooses ￿left￿ :
Your payo⁄ is: 21 points
The payo⁄ for the other one is: 11 points
You choose ￿bottom￿ ; the other one chooses ￿center￿ :
Your payo⁄ is: 62 points
The payo⁄ for the other one is: 89 points
You choose ￿bottom￿ ; the other one chooses ￿right￿ :
Your payo⁄ is: 89 points
The payo⁄ for the other one is: 78 points
Please note that the possible payo⁄ points for you and the other one remain the same in
every round.
The other one always has exactly the same input screen in front of him/her as you do. After
you and the other one have chosen between the three alternatives, you will be informed of your
36payo⁄ in this round. This is the only information you will be given during the experiment in each
round. The next round begins after that.
Statement of expectations
a) How can you state your expectations? Before each decision-making situation, you
will be asked how you estimate the decision-making behavior of the other one. This means that
at the beginning of each round we will require you to predict how the other one will decide in this
round. You will have to answer the following question:
In how many out of 100 cases do you expect the other one to decide on ￿left￿ , ￿center￿or ￿right￿ ?
Of course, the other one makes his decision only once in each round. You could also consider
the question as asking you to state the likelihood that each of the three alternatives is chosen by
the other one. You will see the following input screen on the computer:
37Your three alternatives, ￿top￿ , ￿middle￿and ￿bottom￿ , are listed in the table above, as
well as the corresponding possible payo⁄. Below that, there is the question with the three boxes.
Let us assume that you are sure that the other one will choose ￿right￿ , and de￿nitely not
￿center￿or ￿left￿ . Then you would respond to our question by entering the number 100 in the
box for ￿right￿ and the number 0 in the boxes for ￿center￿ and ￿left￿ . Alternatively, we could
assume that you think the other one will probably choose ￿center￿ , but there is still a small chance
that s/he will choose ￿right￿ , and an even smaller chance that s/he will choose ￿left￿ . Then, for
example, you might respond to our question by entering the number 70 for ￿center￿ , 20 for ￿right￿
and 10 for ￿left￿ .
If you think it is even more unlikely that s/he will choose ￿center￿ , then you could enter,
for example, 60 for ￿center￿ , 24 for ￿right￿and 16 for ￿left￿ . Or it is possible that you think it is
equally likely that the other one will choose ￿left￿ , ￿center￿and ￿right￿ . Then you should enter,
for example, the numbers 33, 33, 34 in the boxes.
Please note that the three numbers may not be decimal, and that they must always add up
to 100.
N.B.: The numbers used in the examples have been chosen arbitrarily. They
give you no indication how you and the other one decide.
b) How is the payo⁄ for your stated expectations calculated? Your payo⁄ is
calculated after you have guessed how frequently the other one chooses his/her three alternatives.
Your payo⁄ depends on the di⁄erence between your estimate of the frequency of the decision and
the actual decision made. Your payo⁄ is higher when you have guessed that the other one often
makes the ￿true￿decision (which s/he really made), and it is lower when you have guessed that
the other one will make this decision infrequently. Similarly, your payo⁄ is higher when you have
correctly predicted that the other one will not make a particular decision and then s/he in fact
does not make the decision.
The exact calculation of the payo⁄ is as follows: We calculate a number for each of the
three alternatives. This number re￿ ects how appropriate your estimate of the decision frequency
of the corresponding alternative was. We take these three numbers to calculate your payo⁄.
First, we consider how well you predicted the alternatives which were actually chosen. Let
us assume that the other one chose ￿left￿ . We then compare your estimate of how often the other
one would choose ￿left￿out of 100 cases with the number 100, and calculate the di⁄erence between
38the two. This di⁄erence is then multiplied by itself and the resulting number multiplied by the
factor 0.0005. Thus, if you expected the other one to choose ￿left￿in many out of 100 cases, then
this number will be smaller (since the di⁄erence between your estimate and 100 is small) than if
you expected that s/he would choose ￿left￿in few out of 100 cases.
Then we consider how well you predicted that the other two alternatives would not be
chosen. Let us assume again, for example, that the other one chose ￿left￿ , which at the same time
means that ￿center￿and ￿right￿were not chosen. Then we take your estimate for the alternative
￿center￿and multiply this by itself. The resulting number is again multiplied by the factor 0.0005.
We apply this procedure again to your estimate for the alternative ￿right￿ . We then take the three
numbers thus calculated and deduct them from the number 10. This determines the number of
points you receive for your statement of expectations.
As an illustration of how your payo⁄ might appear, let us consider three examples. Let us
assume that the other one chose ￿left￿and that your estimate for ￿left￿was 100 and correspondingly
0 for the other two alternatives. This means that you have stated an estimate that is exactly right.
Consequently, you earn the following points:
10 ￿ 0:0005 ￿ (100 ￿ 100)
2 ￿ 0:0005 ￿ 02 ￿ 0:0005 ￿ 02 = 10
Let us assume again that the other one chose ￿left￿ . Your estimate for ￿left￿was 60, for
￿center￿20 and for ￿right￿20, which means that your stated estimate predicted that the other
one would choose ￿left￿more frequently than ￿center￿and ￿right￿ . Consequently, you earn the
following points:
10 ￿ 0:0005 ￿ (100 ￿ 60)
2 ￿ 0:0005 ￿ 202 ￿ 0:0005 ￿ 202 = 8:8
If we still assume that the other one chose ￿left￿ , but your estimate for ￿left￿was 0, for
￿center￿ also 0 and for ￿right￿ 100, this means that your stated estimate was exactly wrong.
Consequently, you earn the following points:
10 ￿ 0:0005 ￿ (100 ￿ 0)
2 ￿ 0:0005 ￿ 02 ￿ 0:0005 ￿ 1002 = 0
39N.B.: The numbers used in the examples have been chosen arbitrarily. They
give no indication how you and the other one decide.
These examples should make it clear that you will always receive a payo⁄ of at least 0
points, and at most 10 points for your stated expectations. And the closer your estimations, the
more money you earn. (You may be asking yourself why we have chosen such a payo⁄ ruling as
described above. The reason being that with such a payo⁄ ruling, you can expect the highest
payment when you state numbers that are closest to your own estimate.)
Procedure and payment The experiment consists of 20 rounds altogether. In each round, you
have to ￿rst state your estimate of the behavior of the other one, and then make your own decision.
At the end of the experiment, a round each for the decision-making situation and for the
statement of expectations will be chosen randomly in order to determine your earnings in the
experiment. The choice of both rounds will be made randomly by the experiment leader throwing
a dice. The chosen rounds will then be entered onto the input screen by the experiment leader.
At the end of the experiment, you will see an overview of your earnings from the decision-making
situation and your earnings from the statement of expectation, as well as the total amount. The
payo⁄ that you have attained in the corresponding round chosen will be converted at a rate of
1 point = 15 cents
and will be paid out in cash.
Do you have any questions?
40Control questions Now you have to answer 7 questions. In this way we are checking whether
you have understood the decisions you have to make during the experiment. Should you have any
further questions, please raise your hand and one of the experiment leaders will come to you. The
experiment will not start until all participants have answered the control questions correctly.
The decision-making situation:
1. If you choose ￿bottom￿and the other one chooses ￿center￿ , how many points do you earn?
________
2. If you choose ￿middle￿and the other one chooses ￿left￿ , how many points does the other one
earn?
________
3. If we assume your payo⁄ amounts to 12, which decision did the other one make?
________
414. If you choose ￿bottom￿and the other one chooses ￿left￿ , how much do you earn and how
much does the other one earn?
The other one:___________ You:__________
5. Consider the following two cases:
You expect the other one to choose ￿left￿in 80 out of 100 cases. The other one actually does
choose ￿left￿ . You expect the other one to choose ￿left￿in 20 out of 100 cases. The other one
actually chooses ￿right￿ . In both cases we assume that you expect the other one to choose
￿center￿in 0 out of 100 cases.
Is your payo⁄ for the statement of expectation in the ￿rst case:
higher the same lower (Please underline your answer!)
than in the second case?
6. Imagine that Participant 1 states the following expectation: The other one chooses ￿left￿
in 50 out of 100 cases, ￿center￿in 20 out of 100 cases, and ￿right￿in 30 out of 100 cases.
Participant 2 expects the following: the other one chooses ￿left￿ in 60 out of 100 cases,
￿center￿ in 20 out of 100 cases, and ￿right￿ in 20 out of 100 cases. We will assume that
the other one chose ￿left￿by Participant 1 as well as by Participant 2. Who will receive the
highest payo⁄?
Participant _____
7. If you consider all three alternatives to be equally possible, which numbers should you then
enter?
left:________ center:_________ right:_________
Thank you for participating in the experiment!
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